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Summary. For several decades, legal and scientific scholars have argued that conclu-
sions from forensic examinations should be supported by statistical data and reported
within a probabilistic framework. Multiple models have been proposed to quantify the
probative value of forensic evidence. Unfortunately, several of these models rely on ad-
hoc strategies that are not scientifically sound. The opacity of the technical jargon used
to present these models and their results, and the complexity of the techniques involved
make it very difficult for the untrained user to separate the wheat from the chaff. This series
of papers is intended to help forensic scientists and lawyers recognise limitations and is-
sues in tools proposed to interpret the results of forensic examinations. This paper focuses
on tools that have been proposed to leverage the use of similarity scores to assess the
probative value of forensic findings. We call this family of tools “score-based likelihood ra-
tios”. In this paper, we present the fundamental concepts on which these tools are built, we
describe some specific members of this family of tools, and we explore their convergence
to the Bayes factor through an intuitive geometrical approach and through simulations. Fi-
nally, we discuss their validation and their potential usefulness as a decision-making tool
in forensic science.
Keywords: Bayes factor; Weight of evidence; Pattern evidence; Trace evidence;
Biometry; Score-based likelihood ratios; distance/similarity measures
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2 Neumann and Ausdemore
1. Introduction
For more than half a century, legal and scientific scholars have widely advocated Bayesian
reasoning for handling the uncertainty in the determination of the source of forensic
evidence (see Evett (1998) for a historical reference, Aitken and Taroni (2004) for a
general introduction). Bayesian inference revolves around the use of the Bayes factor
to update one’s prior beliefs about two competing propositions related to the source of
the evidence. The updated beliefs are often called posterior beliefs. Posterior beliefs
are probabilities and do not equate to categorical decisions. The path leading from
a posterior probability to a decision involves the use of loss functions and has been
described, in the forensic context, by Biedermann et al. (2008). Proponents of Bayesian
reasoning argue that it is the only coherent and logical manner for performing inferences
in forensic science. They further argue that, in casework, forensic scientists do not possess
the information that would allow them to assign prior beliefs to the propositions that are
considered. Consequently, forensic scientists should limit themselves to reporting Bayes
factors and let others (e.g., fact-finders, jurors, judges) complete the inference process.
Therefore, the challenge for forensic scientists is to assign values to the Bayes factors
for various evidence types (e.g., fibre, paint, glass, fingerprints, footwear impressions,
handwriting, toolmarks, etc.).
Forensic scientists have been able to assign Bayes factors to simple forms of forensic
evidence for many years1. For example, the statistical models used to quantify the
weight of single DNA profiles or simple mixtures of DNA profiles are well understood2.
Conversely, only anecdotical attempts have been made to assign Bayes factors to complex
forms of forensic evidence, such as handwriting and fingerprint evidence (Bozza et al.,
2008; Forbes et al., 2014; Neumann et al., 2015; Tackett, 2018).
Assigning Bayes factors to complex evidence forms requires defining reasonable likeli-
hood functions to represent the joint distributions of heterogenous and high-dimensional
feature vectors3.
To bypass the need to work with intractable likelihood functions, researchers have
concentrated on the use of (dis)similarity metrics or kernel functions to reduce the
complexity and dimensionality of the problem. These attempts have given rise to a
family of ad-hoc methods aimed at describing the probative value of forensic evidence.
We call these methods “score-based likelihood ratios”.
In this paper, we show that these ad-hoc tools offered to support Bayesian inference of
the source of complex forms of evidence may have some merits as deterministic decision
tools; however, their use within a Bayesian paradigm is not appropriate. As a result,
1The adjective “simple” refers to the level of complexity of the mathematical representation of
the evidence and of the probabilistic models involved; it is not used to qualify how the evidence
is transferred, recovered or analysed.
2A single DNA profile is usually represented by a small set of independent bivariate categorical
vectors, which joint distributions under the two competing propositions are usually trivial to
model.
3For example, in the case of fingerprint evidence, a single minutia can be represented by
its Euclidean coordinates (bivariate continuous variable), its type (nominal variable) and its
direction in the ridge flow (circular variable). An impression where n minutiae are observed is
then represented by a 4n-long vector, which contains three different types of variables.
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they cannot be used to update prior beliefs on the source of a finger impression as part of
Bayesian reasoning, and they are not fulfilling the requirements set forth by the legal and
scientific scholars who advocate for a move towards a more formal Bayesian approach in
forensic science. Specifically, we show that:
(a) Some tools do not address the question of interest;
(b) Some tools can induce incoherent inference, in the sense that they can support
both mutually exclusive propositions using the same information obtained from
the evidence;
(c) Some tools may unpredictably over- or underestimate the weight of the evidence
represented by a set of trace and control objects.
2. Common source vs. specific source scenarios
The inference of the identity of the donor of a trace from its comparison with control
material from a known source requires considering two mutually exclusive hypotheses,
denoted H0 and H1 below
4. A certain lack of formalism in the formulation of these
hypotheses has resulted in the development of models and the collection of data that
mismatch the needs of the criminal justice system.
The next sections briefly develop two formal scenarios that frame the inference of the
source of forensic evidence: the common source scenario and the specific source scenario
(Ommen et al., 2017). These scenarios are often confused with one another. This results
in the development of models under one scenario to answer the question considered by
the other one. Thus, understanding their differences is important and helps assess the
potential and limitations of the different inference frameworks for forensic evidence.
2.1. Common source scenario
The common source scenario considers whether two pieces of forensic evidence originate
from the same source or from different sources without formally specifying which sources
are considered. This scenario typically relates to inference of the source of two trace
samples, eu1 and eu2 (e.g., two finger impressions recovered on two different crime scenes
or even on the same crime scene), with the goal of determining if they originate from the
same unknown source (e.g., determining whether the two scenes are linked or whether
there were one or more perpetrators).
The hypotheses considered in the common source scenario can be stated as follows:
H0CS : eu1 and eu2 originate from the same, unknown, source;
H1CS : eu1 and eu2 originate from two different, unknown, sources.
In this scenario, the true source of each piece of evidence is considered to be a random
source from a population of potential sources. Under H0CS , the source of the two pieces
of evidence is the same random source, while the evidence material originate from two
different random sources under H1CS
4These hypotheses are commonly called the prosecution hypothesis and defence hypothesis
(Aitken and Taroni, 2004).
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2.2. Specific source scenario
Contrary to the previous scenario, the specific source scenario typically involves the
comparison of trace material, eu, with control material from a known source, es, with
the goal of determining if the trace was made by the considered source. The hypotheses
considered in the specific source scenario can be stated as follows:
H0SS : eu and es were made by Source X.;
H1SS : eu was made by another source than Source X.
In this scenario, Source X is identified. It can be considered fixed. Under H1SS , the
true source of eu is unknown and is considered to be a random source from a population
of potential sources, while Source X remains the undisputed donor of es.
The distinction between both scenarios is not merely theoretical. Each scenario
results in different likelihood functions for the same information, and in different inter-
pretations of the results of forensic examinations.
In the vast majority of cases, the inference questions of greatest interest to the crim-
inal justice system fall under the umbrella of the specific source scenario. Nevertheless,
the determination that two pieces of evidence were made by the same unknown source
may be relevant to some investigations (e.g., for forensic intelligence-led investigations).
Since these two scenarios are different and consider two radically different pairs of hy-
potheses, it seems intuitive that they should not be interchanged. Unfortunately, they
are often confused.
2.3. Generative models
This paper explores the convergence of different models and inference frameworks partly
through simulations. The simulations rely on generative models that give simplified
representations of how the data arise under the different hypotheses laid out in Sections
2.1 and 2.2. These simplified models are used throughout the paper and are introduced
below.
We consider a simple univariate setting to explore the construction and convergence
of the different Bayes factors in the common and specific source scenarios. The common
source scenario considers whether two traces originate from the same, unknown, source;
thus, the generative models under both common source hypotheses can be represented
by two hierarchical random effects models:
eu1 = µ+ d1 + u1, where d1 ∼ N(0, σ2d) and u1 ∼ N(0, σ2u1);
eu2 = µ+ d2 + u2, where d2 ∼ N(0, σ2d) and u2 ∼ N(0, σ2u2);
where µ is the mean of the population of sources, d1 and d2 are random effects due to
sources, and u1 and u2 are random effects due to objects within sources
5.
5If we consider the practical example of fingerprint evidence, µ represents the mean of the
distribution of the characteristics of all friction ridge skin in a population; d1 and d2 represent
the deviations between the overall mean of the population, µ, and the friction ridge characteristics
of the first and second sources; u1 and u2 are random effects that affect the final appearance (after
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Under H0CS , the two pieces of evidence originate from the same source and, thus,
have the same value for d1 and d2
6. Under H1CS , the two pieces of evidence originate
from two different sources and are therefore independent. Thus, the respective joint
distributions of eu1 and eu2 are:
(
eu1
eu2
)
|H0CS ∼ MVN
((
µ
µ
)
,
(
σ2d + σ
2
u1 σ
2
d
σ2d σ
2
d + σ
2
u2
))
;(
eu1
eu2
)
|H1CS ∼ MVN
((
µ
µ
)
,
(
σ2d + σ
2
u1 0
0 σ2d + σ
2
u2
))
. (1)
The generative models in the specific source scenario differ depending on whether
H0SS or H1SS is considered. Under H0SS , when all evidence originate from the same
source, the models are two simple random effects models:
eu = µd + u, where u ∼ N(0, σ2u);
es = µd + s, where s ∼ N(0, σ2s);
and, where µd represents the mean for the considered specific source, and u and s are
random effects respectively corresponding to trace and control samples.
Under H1SS , the generative model for the control material from the specific source is
the same as under H0SS (indeed, there is no dispute that es originates from the known
source). However, the model for the trace material, eu, is a hierarchical random effects
model to reflect that its true source is an unknown source in the population of potential
sources:
eu = µ+ d+ u, where d ∼ N(0, σ2d) and u ∼ N(0, σ2u);
es = µd + s, where s ∼ N(0, σ2s);
and where µ, µd, d, u and s are defined as above
7.
Under H0SS , trace and control materials are independent given µd, and their joint
distribution is multivariate normal. Under H1SS , trace and control materials are inde-
pendent since they are not from the same source, and their joint distribution is also
multivariate normal. We have:
development, transfer, photography, etc.) of fingerprints resulting from different impressions of
the fingers represented by u1 and u2 on various surfaces. The effects u1 and u2 may be distinct
as two impressions may be affected by different sets of factors
6Note that they do not necessarily have the same value for σ2u if the different pieces of evidence
were left under different conditions.
7A similar analogy to the one made in Footnote 5 can be made here. The constant µd represents
the characteristics of the friction ridge skin of a specific finger from a known individual (e.g., a
suspect). The effect d represents the characteristics of the friction ridge skin of a specific finger
from an unknown individual (e.g., the true donor of the latent print). The random effects u
and s affect the final appearance (after development, transfer, photography, etc.) of fingerprints
resulting from different impressions of the fingers represented by µd and d on various surfaces.
The variance terms, σ2u and σ
2
s , may be distinct as latent and control prints are acquired under
different sets of conditions.
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(
eu
es
)
|H0SS ∼ MVN
((
µd
µd
)
,
(
σ2u 0
0 σ2s
))
;(
eu
es
)
|H1SS ∼ MVN
((
µ
µd
)
,
(
σ2d + σ
2
u 0
0 σ2s
))
. (2)
If we take the view that forensic evidence must be evaluated within a Bayesian
paradigm, then we are interested in quantifying the weight of the evidence using Bayes
factors (or, when the parameters are known, likelihood ratios). In the common source
framework, the likelihood ratio for eu1 and eu2 is (Ommen et al., 2017):
LRCS =
f(eu, es|H0CS)
f(eu, es|H1CS)
=
f(eu, es|H0CS)
f(eu|H1CS)f(es|H1CS)
; (3)
while the likelihood ratio for eu and es in the specific source framework is (Ommen et al.,
2017):
LRSS =
f(eu, es|H0SS)
f(eu, es|H1SS)
=
f(eu|H0SS)
f(eu|H1SS)
. (4)
2.4. Convergence of specific and common source Bayes factors
We already mentioned that, in many cases, forensic scientists are working within the
context of the specific source scenario. They are provided with trace material and they
want to infer whether it originates from the same specific source that was used to obtain
the control material. Using the toy examples in Equations (1) and (2), we can study the
convergence of the common source likelihood ratio in Equation (3) to the specific source
likelihood ratio in Equation (4) that should be used to quantify appropriately the weight
of the evidence.
To compare these likelihood ratios, we consider pairs of eu and es generated by the
model in Equation (2) under H0SS or H1SS and we calculate the likelihood ratios in
Equations (3) and (4). To calculate the common source likelihood ratio using the data
generated under the specific source model, we set eu1 = eu, eu2 = es, σ
2
u1 = σ
2
u and
σ2u2 = σ
2
s .
Figure 1 presents the results of three experiments. In all three experiments, µ = 10,
σ2d = 10 and σ
2
u = 2. All simulations were repeated 1,000 times. In the first experiment,
the characteristics of the source of es were chosen to be relatively common with respect
to the population of sources (µd = 9) but also quite variable (σ
2
s = 1). In the second
experiment, the characteristics of the source of es were chosen to be rare with respect
to the population of sources (µd = 0) but remained variable (σ
2
s = 1). In the last
experiment, the variability of the characteristics of the known source of the control
material was chosen to be virtually negligible (σ2s = 10
−5)8.
8The values for the models’ parameters are chosen to represent different situations: paint,
glass and fibres are material with somewhat large within-source variability and their specificity
is variable; control finger impressions have low within-source variability and contain a large
number of very discriminative features; finally, DNA profiles obtained directly from individuals
have virtually not within-source variability (in terms of allelic designation) and are highly specific
to these individuals.
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Fig. 1. Comparisons between LRs in the common source (y-axis) and specific source scenarios
(x-axis). Columns: the left column reports the results when eu and es have been sampled
under H0SS ; the right column reports the results under H1SS . Rows: (a) the source of the
control material has common characteristics; (b) the source of the control material has rare
characteristics; (c) the source of the control material has common characteristics, however it
has virtually no variance.
The results of the experiments show that likelihood ratios for the common and the
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specific source scenarios do not converge unless the variability of the source of the control
material is negligible9. Importantly, the results for the first two experiments in Figure
1 show that the common source likelihood ratio unpredictably over- or underestimates
the value of the specific source likelihood ratio. That said, while assigning a common
source likelihood ratio when H1SS is true may underestimate the corresponding specific
source likelihood ratio, Figure 1 shows that common source likelihood ratios have a
marked tendency to overestimate their counterparts (we have not found a situation where
common source likelihood ratios consistently underestimate specific source likelihood
ratios).
The lack of convergence raises issues regardless of whether H0SS or H1SS is true.
When H0SS is true, underestimating the value of the specific source likelihood ratio may
result in the erroneous exclusion of the source of the control impressions as the source of
the trace impression. While this is an obvious issue, the criminal justice system currently
considers this to be a better outcome than the erroneous identification of an innocent.
Furthermore, when H0SS is true, overestimating the value of the specific source likelihood
ratio only results in being overconfident in the support of the correct conclusion that the
source of the control material is also the source of the trace material; thus, the impact
of the overestimation may be considered minimal. Unfortunately, when H1SS is true,
overestimating the value of the specific source likelihood ratio may result in exculpatory
evidence not being given the appropriate weight in favour of an innocent, yet suspected,
source. In fact, Figures 1(a) and (b) show that some pieces of evidence result in values
of the specific source likelihood ratios that are less than one and values of the common
source likelihood ratios that are greater than one.
Ultimately, miss-specifying the interpretation framework results in answering the
wrong question, and may result in serious miscarriages of justice when the common
source likelihood ratio is used instead of the specific source one.
3. Score-based likelihood ratios
The use of scores to calculate score-based likelihood ratios can be tracked back to the late
1990s and early 2000s and the field of speaker recognition, fingerprint and other types
of evidence (Meuwly and Drygajlo, 2001; Champod et al., 2001; Gonzalez-Rodriguez
et al., 2003, 2005, 2006; Egli et al., 2006; Meuwly, 2006; Neumann et al., 2007; Neumann
and Margot, 2009; Egli-Anthonioz and Champod, 2014). The natural proximity of these
forensic sub-disciplines and biometry have led researchers to quickly realise the benefits
of modelling the (dis)similarity between pairs of observations, rather than modelling
complex feature vectors in their original space. This enabled them to bypass the need to
work with the intractable likelihood functions associated with complex forms of pattern
and trace evidence, and, instead, allowed them to model univariate continuous data.
Different constructions of score-based likelihood ratios have been proposed over the
9This is typically the case for forensic DNA analysis when single full DNA profiles are consid-
ered. Since the allelic designation of a full DNA profile is extremely reproducible, the inference
of the identity of source of a pair of full DNA profiles will be the same under both common and
specific source scenarios. This may explain why the distinction between common and specific
source scenarios was not discussed until recently by Ommen et al. (2017).
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years and, despite their limitations, their use in casework is advocated (at least in Europe
by the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) (2016)). The concept
behind most models rests on the comparison of the likelihood of the score calculated
between a single trace object, eu, and a single control object from a known source,
es, evaluated in two different density functions. These density functions are based on
the sampling distributions of the score under two mutually exclusive propositions. The
concept is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2 which shows the ratio of f(δ(eu, es)|H0)
and f(δ(eu, es)|H1), where δ(eu, es) is the score between the single trace and single
control objects, and f(·|H0) and f(·|H1) represents the sampling distributions of interest.
We warn the reader that other models involving scores have been proposed (Armstrong
et al., 2017; Swofford et al., 2018; Ausdemore et al., 2019; Hendricks et al., 2019) but
are not considered to be score-based likelihood ratios. These models do not rely on the
ratio of the likelihoods of the score in two sampling distributions. For example, the right
panel of Figure 2 shows the concept underlying a model called FRStat (Swofford et al.,
2018)10, which relies on the ratio of two tail probabilities bounded by the score between
a trace and a control object.
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Fig. 2. Comparison between two different concepts for the use of summary statistics/kernel
functions to provide some information on the probative value of fingerprint evidence. Left panel:
score-based likelihood ratio obtained by calculating the ratio of the density of a summary statistic
for an observed pair of trace and control objects, δ(eu, es), in its sampling distribution under the
first proposition and in its sampling distribution under the second proposition. Right panel:
FRStat-like (Swofford et al., 2018; Neumann, 2019) ratio obtained by calculating the ratio of
α- and β-error types associated with a decision of identification or exclusion at an observed
level of dissimilarity of a pair of trace and control impressions, δ(eu, es), using the two sampling
distributions under the two propositions.
10See Neumann (2019) for a critic of FRStat
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3.1. Similarity metrics and kernel functions
A score can have two interpretations: it can be seen as a summary statistic resulting
from the comparison of two objects, or it can be seen as the scalar projection resulting
from the inner product of two vectors. In the first case, we talk about (dis)similarity
metrics, while in the second case we talk about kernel functions. Both functions map
complex random vectors from their natural space to the real line, R, and both offer
great flexibility to researchers. First, researchers can design algorithms that measure
the distance between two objects, such that the value representing that distance is
minimised when the two objects originate from the same source, and is maximised when
they originate from different sources11. Secondly, the level of (dis)similarity between
pairs of objects can be expressed as a univariate continuous random variable, which
probability distribution is significantly more convenient to model than the distribution
of original vectors representing the observations made on the impressions. However,
the benefits of being able to work in a continuous univariate space are not without
limitations, which are explored below.
When the function used to calculate scores is considered as a summary statistic, we
can discuss the sampling distributions of the score under various situations. When the
score function is considered to be a kernel function, the score has a geometric inter-
pretation. Formally, a score interpreted as a summary statistic of the (dis)similarity
between two objects ei and ej can be defined as δ(ei, ej), where δ is any function with a
real-valued output. A score interpreted as the inner product of two vectors can be sim-
ilarly defined as κ(ei, ej) = 〈η(ei), η(ej)〉, where κ is a kernel function, η is a set of basis
expansions and 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product. The main difference between δ and κ is that
κ has to be a positive semi-definite symmetric function, while there is no requirement
for the construction of δ.
These two different perspectives on the score function are used to investigate the
different score-based models in the next sections. The generative models described in
Section 2.3 are used to discuss the convergence of these models to the specific source
likelihood ratio of interest in Equation (4) as we did in Section 2.4. In order to perform
these simulations, both δ and κ are defined as the squared Euclidean distance, which
is both a summary statistic and a valid kernel function, and which also has tractable
distributions for the chosen generative models (Hepler et al., 2012).
3.2. Common source score-based models
The models in the following sections are best introduced through experiments that allow
to study the sampling distributions under the two alternative propositions.
The first type of score-based model is based on results obtained in biometry (Section
4.3 in Ross et al. (2006))12. The score, δ(eu, es), is evaluated using sampling distributions
11Some algorithms maximise the value of the score when the objects originate from the same
source, and minimise it when the objects originate from different sources. The upcoming discus-
sion on the use of scores is not affected by their interpretation as similarity scores or distances.
12Early papers on the use of scores to approximate Bayes factors in forensic science lack clarity
on how the sampling distributions of the scores were studied. While it seems that the work by
Champod et al. (2001) and Gonzalez-Rodriguez et al. (2005) describes asymmetric score-based
likelihood ratios (see Section 3.5), it may be that they are in fact common source score-based
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based on the following thought experiments:
(a) When the prosecutor proposition is correct, δ(eu, es) is a score that is calculated
by comparing trace and control material from the same, random, source. The
sampling distribution of δ(eu, es) under H0 can be studied by considering a sample
of sources from a relevant population, and by sampling and comparing a single
trace and a single control object from each source.
(b) When the defence proposition is correct, δ(eu, es) is a score that is calculated by
comparing trace and control objects from different sources. The sampling distribu-
tion of δ(eu, es) under H1 can be studied by sampling independent pairs of objects
from a relevant population, and by comparing a trace object from the first source
to a control object from the second source.
This type of model has one main advantage: both sampling distributions can be
learned ahead of time based on a large sample of sources from a relevant population.
Once learned, the two sampling distributions can be used for any new case. It also has
two main limitations. First, it is only reporting the average density of δ(eu, es) under
both propositions. Neither sampling distribution is specific to the donor of es. This type
of model clearly addresses the common source pair of propositions and is not relevant
to a specific case involving the comparison of a trace object to known control material
from a given source. Second, Bayes factors can roughly be viewed as the ratio between
some measure of similarity between the characteristics of the trace and control objects,
and some measure of the rarity of the characteristics of the trace. However, the model
described above does not account for the rarity of the trace characteristics at all. This
type of model only accounts for the rarity of the level of similarity13.
To compare this type of model to the specific source likelihood ratio in Eq. 4, we use
the generative models proposed in Eq. 1. By defining δ(eu, es) = (eu1 − eu2)2, we have
that:
(eu1 − eu2)2|H0CS ∼
1
σ2u1 + σ
2
u2
χ2
(
(eu1 − eu2)2
σ2u1 + σ
2
u2
)
,
(eu1 − eu2)2|H1CS ∼
1
σ2u1 + σ
2
u2 + 2σ
2
p
χ2
(
(eu1 − eu2)2
σ2u1 + σ
2
u2 + 2σ
2
p
)
, (5)
and that:
SLRCS =
f((eu1 − eu2)2|H0CS)
f((eu1 − eu2)2|H1CS)
. (6)
likelihood ratios (or at least calculated as such).
13For example, consider a bloodstain recovered at a crime scene. A suspect, who has blood of
the same type as the bloodstain, is considered. Clearly, the information that the type of the
blood recovered at a crime scene is the same as the one of the suspect will be a lot more helpful
to support the inference that the blood comes from the suspect if the blood type is AB− (less
than 1% of the population) than if the blood type is O+ (approx. 40% of the population). Yet,
under the defence proposition, the model described above only assigns a probability to the event
that the two blood types correspond by chance without accounting for the specific type of the
blood at the crime scene.
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The results of the comparison of Equations (4) and (6) using our toy example are
presented in Figure 3. To study the convergence of LRSS and SLRCS , we set eu1 = eu,
eu2 = es, σ
2
u1 = σ
2
u and σ
2
u2 = σ
2
s . In both models, µ = 10, σ
2
d = 10 and σ
2
u = 2.
All simulations were repeated 1,000 times. In the first experiment, the characteristics
of the donor of es were chosen to be relatively common with respect to the population
of donors (µd = 9) but also quite variable (σ
2
s = 1). In the second experiment, the
characteristics of the donor of es were chosen to be rare with respect to the population
of donors (µd = 0) with a virtually negligible variability (σ
2
s = 10
−5).
The same general conclusions drawn from the data presented in Figure 1 can be
reached when observing the data presented in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows that the SLRCS
have a marked tendency to overestimate their LRSS counterparts, which may not nec-
essarily be a problem when H0SS is true; however, the use of SLRCS to report forensic
evidence in court may be very detrimental to innocent suspects. We also note the par-
ticular behaviour of the relationship between LRSS and SLRCS when the variance of
the control impressions is very small.
Overall, common source score-based models may be convenient to implement, but
are not relevant to most examinations of forensic interest, and do not converge to the
weight of forensic evidence. The lack of convergence between LRSS and SLRCS is not
only a by-product of the use of a potentially non-sufficient summary statistic as the score
between a pair of impressions, but also results from the inadequacy of Equation (6) to
account for the rarity of the characteristics observed on the trace impression.
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Fig. 3. Comparisons between SLRs in the common source scenario with the LR in the specific
source scenario. Columns: the left column reports the results when eu and es have been
sampled under H0SS ; the right column reports the results under H1SS . Rows: (a) the source
of the control impression is common and has some variance; (b) the source of the control
impression is rare and has virtually no variance.
3.3. Suspect-centred score-based models
A second type of score-based model was proposed to be more relevant to the case at hand
(Hepler et al., 2012; Alberink et al., 2014). According to this type of model, the sampling
distributions of δ(eu, es) can be represented by the following thought experiments:
(a) When the prosecutor proposition is correct, δ(eu, es) is a score that is calculated
by comparing a trace and a control object that have been both obtained from the
source of es. Thus, the sampling distribution of δ(eu, es) under H0 can be studied
by sampling, and comparing, independent pairs of trace and control objects from
the source of es.
(b) When the defence proposition is correct, δ(eu, es) is a score that is calculated by
comparing trace objects sampled from random sources in a relevant population to
control objects from the source of es
14.
14This may seem counterintuitive, and the reader may wonder why trace objects, rather than
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This type of score-based model has been designed to address the specific source pair
of propositions since it is “anchored” on the control material obtained from the putative
source. Nonetheless, it does not address the issue of the rarity of the trace characteristics
as it only estimates the probability of the control material using a sample of trace objects
from the population. Furthermore, it may be not be trivial to repeatedly sample trace
and control objects from sources under controlled conditions (i.e., repeatedly resampling
fingerprints from an uncooperative suspect may be tricky). To overcome the latter issue,
authors have proposed to generate pseudo-fingerprints (Neumann et al., 2012; Rodriguez
et al., 2012) or the use of parametric models for the score distributions (Egli et al., 2006;
Egli-Anthonioz and Champod, 2014). To avoid repeatedly sampling control impressions
from the donor of es, it is possible to condition the score-based model on es. The
difference between the unconditioned suspect-centred score-based model described in
the previous paragraph and the conditioned model is that δ(eu, es) and both sampling
distributions use the same fixed es. Mathematically:
SLRSS|es =
f(δ(eu, es), es|H0SS)
f(δ(eu, es), es|H1SS)
=
f(δ(eu, es)|es, H0SS)
f(δ(eu, es)|es, H1SS)
f(es|H0SS)
f(es|H1SS)
=
f(δ(eu, es)|es, H0SS)
f(δ(eu, es)|es, H1SS)
. (7)
The second ratio in Equation (7) cancels out since the characteristics of the control
material have the same density irrespective of whether the source of es is also the source
of the trace material. From the generative models proposed in Equation (2), and with
δ(eu, es) = (eu1 − eu2)2, we obtain the following sampling distributions for δ(eu, es):
(eu − es)2|es, H0SS ∼
1
σ2u
χ2
(
(eu − es)2
σ2u
, λ =
(µp − es)2
σ2u
)
(eu − es)2|es, H1SS ∼
1
σ2u + σ
2
p
χ2
(
(eu − es)2
σ2u + σ
2
p
, λ =
(µ− es)2
σ2u + σ
2
p
)
. (8)
These sampling distributions enable us to compare the likelihood ratio of interest, LRSS ,
with its proxy, SLRSS|es . This comparison is reported in Figure 4 using the same
parameter values as those used to generate the results presented in Figures 1 and 315.
The model proposed in Equation (7) certainly seems to be a reasonable ad-hoc so-
lution: it is specific to the suspected source; the required sampling/simulation of trace
objects from relevant sources can be achieved by using a suitable parametric model of
the score distributions; furthermore, under the reasonable assumption, for some evidence
types, that control objects have very limited variance, it will mostly converge to the spe-
cific source likelihood ratio of interest (Figure 4(c)). Unfortunately, this type of model
is plagued by a fundamental lack of coherence: indeed, with these models, a given piece
control objects, are randomly sampled from sources in the relevant population. This sampling
model is rooted in the definition of the generative model in Equation (2): in the specific source
scenario, there is no dispute that es originates from the suspected source.
15Note that the results presented in Figure 4 are highly dependent of the value chosen for es.
In particular, the patterns in Figures 4(a) and (b) are very sensitive to the value of es.
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Fig. 4. Comparisons between SLRs conditioned on es in the specific source scenario with the
LR in the specific source scenario. Columns: the left column reports the results when eu and
es have been sampled under H0SS ; the right column reports the results under H1SS . Rows: (a)
the source of the control object is common and has some variance; (b) the source of the control
object is rare and has some variance; (c) the source of the control object is common and has
virtually no variance.
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of evidence can provide support for either of the alternative propositions, depending on
which proposition is considered first.
To demonstrate this lack of coherence, consider a model designed to address the two
following specific source propositions:
HA: eu originates from Source A;
HB: eu originates from Source B.
We observe the trace object as well as two control objects, one from Source A and one
from Source B. The specific source generative models under HA and HB are described
below.
Under HA, we have:
ea = µa + a,where a ∼ N(0, σ2a); eu = µa + u,where u ∼ N(0, σ2u);
eb = µb + b,where b ∼ N(0, σ2b ).
Under HB, we have:
ea = µa + a,where a ∼ N(0, σ2a);
eb = µb + b,where b ∼ N(0, σ2b ); eu = µb + u,where u ∼ N(0, σ2u).
The specific source likelihood ratio that addresses HA and HB is:
LRSS =
f(eu, ea, eb|HA)
f(eu, ea, eb|HB) =
f(eu|HA)
f(eu|HB) =
(
f(eu|HB)
f(eu|HA)
)−1
. (9)
Thus, LRSS coherently supports the same proposition irrespective of which one is con-
sidered first. However, the specific source SLRSS conditioned on the control impression
considered by the first proposition is:
SLRSS|ea =
f(δ(eu, ea)|ea, HA)
f(δ(eu, ea)|ea, HB) 6=
(
SLRSS|eb
)−1
=
(
f(δ(eu, eb)|eb, HB)
f(δ(eu, eb)|eb, HA)
)−1
. (10)
Equation (10) shows that SLRSS|es is not coherent in general since it potentially does
not support the same proposition depending on which one is considered first. This
lack of coherence can similarly be demonstrated for the unconditioned suspect-centred
score-based likelihood ratio.
The conditioning of δ(eu, es) on es has an interesting geometric interpretation. When
es is fixed, all trace objects from the source considered under H0SS and from the sources
from the population considered under H1SS are compared to the same control object.
It is thus possible to consider that all scores considered in our thought experiment are
equivalent to the scalar projections of the vectors representing all trace objects onto a
vector space defined by es. Figure 5 illustrates this interpretation.
In Figure 5, a vector eu, representing a trace object recovered in connection with a
crime, is compared to objects from sources A and B, represented by two mean vectors,
ea and eb. The left panel shows the orthogonal projection of eu onto ea and eb. The
resulting scalars are the scores calculated by δ(eu, ea) and δ(eu, eb), which are, in this
case, equivalent to κ(eu, ea) and κ(eu, eb).
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Fig. 5. Left panel: vector projection of eu onto ea and eb. Middle panel: vector projection of all
(pseudo-)trace objects, including eu, onto ea. Right panel: vector projection of all (pseudo-)trace
objects, including eu, onto eb.
The middle panel shows the orthogonal projections of (1) eu, (2) multiple pseudo-
trace objects sampled from the source of eb (represented by dots near the tip of eb), and
(3) multiple pseudo-trace objects sampled from the source of ea (represented by dots
near the tip of ea) onto ea. The two density functions represent the distributions of the
scalar projections of these vectors onto ea. According to the middle panel, SLRSS|ea ,
in Equation (10), is equivalent to the ratio of the likelihoods of the scalar projection of
eu onto ea evaluated using the two distributions of the scalar projections of the trace
objects from both suspects onto ea. We see that, in this case, SLRSS|ea would support
the proposition that eu was made by Source B. The right panel shows the same infor-
mation as in the middle panel, but this time, projected onto eb. We see that in this case,
SLRSS|eb would support the proposition that eu was made by Source A. This geometric
interpretation holds in the general case, when the alternative hypothesis is not specific
to a single donor, but considers a population of sources as in Section 2.2. In the general
case, all pseudo-trace objects from all sources of the relevant population are projected
onto the vector representing a single source under H0SS or under H1SS . This results in
the same lack of coherence in the support of the evidence for alternative propositions
representing different sources.
3.4. Trace-centred score-based models
The two types of models presented above lack the ability to account for the rarity of
the characteristics of the trace object, which is crucial to properly quantify the weight
of forensic evidence. To remedy this shortcoming, the use of trace-centred score-based
models is found in Alberink et al. (2014). This type of model is somewhat similar to the
family of suspect-centred models. However, since it is not possible to sample more trace
and control objects from the true source of eu (since it is unknown), these models must
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be conditioned on the observed trace, eu. Mathematically, we have:
SLRSS|eu =
f(δ(eu, es), eu|H0SS)
f(δ(eu, es), eu|H1SS)
=
f(δ(eu, es)|eu, H0SS)
f(δ(eu, es)|eu, H1SS)
f(eu|H0SS)
f(eu|H1SS)
=
f(eu|H0SS)
f(eu|H1SS)
. (11)
Interestingly, the second ratio in Equation (11) does not cancel out. Indeed, the likeli-
hood of observing the trace object, eu, is very different under H0SS and H1SS . In fact,
this ratio corresponds exactly to the likelihood ratio of interest presented in Equation 4.
On the contrary, the first ratio, which includes the score, does cancel since eu is fixed un-
der both propositions due to conditioning, and es has the same distribution under both
propositions in the specific source scenario. This can be seen when using the generative
model in Equation (2) with δ(eu, es) = (eu1 − eu2)2, which results in the same sampling
distributions under both propositions:
(eu − es)2|eu, H0SS ∼
1
σ2s
χ2
(
(eu − es)2
σ2s
, λ =
(eu − µp)2
σ2s
)
;
(eu − es)2|eu, H1SS ∼
1
σ2s
χ2
(
(eu − es)2
σ2s
, λ =
(eu − µp)2
σ2s
)
. (12)
The results in Equations (11) and (12) may seem suspicious at first. Some readers may
consider that, under H1SS , the sampling distribution should involve control objects from
sources in the relevant population. However, H1SS is very clear on the origins of es: its
source is undisputed and it is the same specific source considered in H0SS (see Section 2.2
and Equation (2)). Geometrically, this type of model has a similar interpretation as the
suspect-centred model. The trace-centred model can be understood as the projection of
all control objects onto a vector space defined by eu. However, as mentioned above, the
only control objects available in this type of model are control objects of the source of eu
under both alternative propositions. Therefore, the first ratio in SLRSS|eu will always
be one. In conclusion, it appears that trace-centred score-based likelihood ratios are not
very useful.
3.5. Asymmetric score-based models
A last type of models, which historically happened at the very early stages of the de-
velopment of score-based likelihood ratios and seems to be the most prevalent in the
literature (Champod et al., 2001; Meuwly and Drygajlo, 2001; Meuwly, 2006; Egli et al.,
2006; Gonzalez-Rodriguez et al., 2003, 2005, 2006; Neumann et al., 2007; Neumann and
Margot, 2009), focuses on the putative source in its numerator and on some measure of
the rarity of the characteristics of the trace object in the denominator.
According to this type of model, the sampling distributions of δ(eu, es) can be repre-
sented by the following thought experiments:
(a) When the prosecutor proposition is correct, δ(eu, es) is a score that is calculated
by comparing a trace and a control object that have been both obtained from the
source of es. Thus, the sampling distribution of δ(eu, es) under H0 can be studied
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by sampling, and comparing, independent pairs of trace and control objects from
the source of es. This experiment is similar to the one described for the numerator
of the suspect-centred score-based likelihood ratio in Section 3.3. It may or may
not be conditioned on es.
(b) When the defence proposition is correct, δ(eu, es) is a score that is calculated by
comparing the observed trace objects to a random control object in the popula-
tion of potential sources. Thus, the sampling distribution of δ(eu, es) under H1
can be studied by sampling control objects from the sources in the population of
potential sources and comparing them to eu. This experiment is somewhat similar
to the one that is done to address the denominator of the common source score-
based likelihood ratio, with the modification that control objects are sampled from
the population of sources (instead of trace objects in Section 3.2) and that the
denominator is conditioned on the observed trace, eu.
Mathematically, the asymmetric score-based likelihood ratio could be represented as:
SLRASY =
f(δ(eu, es), es|H0SS)
f(δ(eu, es), eu|H1CS)
=
f(δ(eu, es)|es, H0SS)
f(δ(eu, es)|eu, H1CS)
f(es|H0SS)
f(eu|H1CS)
. (13)
While the first ratio in the right-hand part of Equation 13 seems appealing, at first,
in the sense that it is both suspect and trace anchored, it is clear from Equation 13 that
the ratio does not consider the same evidence in the numerator and in the denominator,
which is a logical violation of the concept of likelihood ratio. Furthermore, the second
ratio in the right-hand part of Equation 13 does not cancel. Thus, we do not see that
SLRASY can possibly converge to the specific source Bayes factor of interest.
4. Discussion and conclusion
Various attempts have been made to quantify the weight of fingerprint evidence. Most
of these attempts suffer from severe shortcomings, which result in unpredictable bias
with respect to the Bayesian inference framework. Some of these shortcomings include
addressing the common source scenario instead of being specific to a suspected donor,
failing to account for the rarity of the features observed on the latent impression, or
providing incoherent evidence which may support both of two mutually exclusive propo-
sitions.
A Bayes factor is the ratio between two probabilities. Following Good (1950), Jef-
freys (1961), Savage (1972), Jaynes (2003), Lindley (2006) and many others (for a recent
review see (Taroni et al., 2016)), we took the view throughout this paper that proba-
bilities can only represent the degree of belief of an individual about an event and are
influenced by the information that he has about the event. Two individuals considering
a particular event from two different perspectives may very well have different degrees
of belief about that event. Thus, probabilities are subjective in the sense that they
represent the personal relationship between the subject and the event.
The Bayes factor is not an intrinsic property of the evidence in itself, and we want to
be very clear that we do not claim that there is such thing as a true or universal Bayes
factor for a given piece of evidence. Different scientists may assign different weights
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to forensic evidence if they characterise the evidence material using different types of
features or measure it using different analytical techniques16, if they organise the data
in different ways17 or if they choose different models to represent the data18.
Nonetheless, the adjectives subjective or personal are not meant to suggest, or justify,
that probabilities can be assigned arbitrarily, or reflect sloppy thinking (Lindley, 2006;
Taroni et al., 2016). Bayes factors have fundamental properties, which should be satisfied
by any method designed to quantify the weight of forensic evidence. These general
properties are applicable to any model designed to assign Bayes factors.
By definition, a Bayes factor provides two pieces of information: which one of the
two competitive propositions is favoured by the evidence, and the amount of support
provided by the evidence. While it may be relatively easy to test the accuracy of a
probabilistic model in large scale simulation settings (i.e., whether the correct proposition
is consistently favoured (Neumann et al., 2007; Haraksim et al., 2015; Leegwater et al.,
2017)), determining the appropriateness of the amount of support is an open problem.
Concentrating on the accuracy of a probabilistic model is arguably equivalent to
considering the method as a deterministic decision-making engine with known error rates.
The use of this type of techniques to infer the source of forensic traces has been explicitly
discouraged by some (European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), 2016)
but encouraged by others (National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies,
2009; President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), 2016). We
agree with Champod (2015), Evett et al. (2017) and Morrison et al. (2017) in that error
rates are only an average measure of performance over a population and do not provide
information regarding the support of the evidence in individual cases.
Accuracy does not inform on whether a particular method supports a given propo-
sition with the appropriate magnitude. Yet, in the legal context, the magnitude of the
Bayes factor is critical. Grossly under- or overestimating the weight of the evidence
can seriously distort the fact-finding process and be prejudicial to the accused19. Some
authors have proposed methods to study the magnitude of the values outputted by prob-
abilistic models (Brummer and du Preez, 2006; Ramos et al., 2013; Ramos and Gonzalez-
Rodriguez, 2013; Haraksim et al., 2015; Leegwater et al., 2017). We believe that some
of these methods have merit and we will discuss them in a future paper. However, none
16For example, glass fragments may be characterised by their refractive index or by their ele-
mental composition.
17Neumann et al. (2015) describe a method to characterise the spatial relationships between
fingerprint landmarks (i.e., minutiae) using triangles and used these triangles to assign probability
distributions to minutiae constellations. However, it is certainly possible to characterise the
spatial relationships between minutiae in many other ways.
18Given a set of observations, a scientist may choose to rely the assumption that the data are
normally distributed, use another parametric model, or use non-parametric models.
19Consider that a partial fingerprint is recovered at a crime scene and is compared to the friction
ridge skin of an accused. A jury will perceive the probative value of the evidence differently and
may reach different conclusions if the reported Bayes factor is one thousand, or one billion.
Depending on the case circumstances, the defence may be able to argue that the other evidence
against the defendant is sufficiently weak that a Bayes factor of one thousand is not sufficient to
reach a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. A similar argument will be excessively difficult to
make if the reported Bayes factor for the forensic evidence turns out to be one billion.
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of these methods answers the question of the appropriateness of these magnitudes or
addresses the soundness of the scientific foundations of a given probabilistic model.
It is also always possible to consider that the magnitude of the value produced by
the model is important as a rank statistic, but not as a value in itself. In this case, we
fall within the realm of likelihoodist inference (Royall, 1997; Kaye, 2012), which is not
necessarily compatible with Bayesian inference.
Therefore, our conclusion is that none of the score-based models proposed to date
can be considered as suitable proxies of the Bayes factor of interest. We are not arguing
that these ad-hoc methods are not useful in their own way, but the harsh reality is that
if one wants to abide by the idea that forensic evidence should be reported within a
Bayesian paradigm, then one cannot use score-based likelihood ratios. We appreciate
that the use of scores may be the only viable method to reduce the complexity of forensic
evidence, but more efforts should be spent in the development of more rigorous models
for handling these scores (see (Armstrong et al., 2017; Ausdemore et al., 2019; Hendricks
et al., 2019) for some early work on these models).
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